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THIS iS a progress report on a larger study of the growth of technical
knowledge. The study as a whole centers on the course of patented
inventions in many American industries from 1836 to 1957. This
paper, however, will deal with only four of the most important
industries—railroading, farming, paper making, and petroleum re-
fining, with primary emphasis on the railroad industry, the industry
for which our data are most complete.
Before our preliminary findings are described, it seems worth while
to say a few words about the. conceptual framework of the project as
a whole. We assume that the growth of modern western industrial
technology has been primarily the result of the interplay of(1) changes
in the state of knowledge and (2) changes in industry. The "state of
knowledge" includes not only science and technology but also any
other aspects of thought, e.g., art and religion, which affect man's
perception of the material universe. "Changes in industry" presumably
change, among other things, the benefits expected from a potential
change in technical knowledge. The "benefits expected" from changing
the stock of technical knowledge are those anticipated and valued by
the unit seeking to make the change. Presumably, in a private enter-
prise economy these benefits usually take the form of profit to the
inventor or his backer.'
Changes in the state of knowledge can influence inventive activity by
affecting either (1) the prospective cost of making an invention and
Nom: The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful criticisms of Leonid Hurwicz,
Simon Kuznets, Fritz Machiup, Robert S. Merrill, and Sidney Winter of an earlier draft
of this paper; the financial support of the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, the
National Science Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the University of Minnesota, and
Michigan State University; the indispensable work of his research assistants who pre-
pared the chronologies of important inventions—Heinrich H. Bruschke in railroading,
A. Luis Darzins in paper making, Sushila Gidwani in petroleum refining, and Allan L.
Olson in farming; the general assistance of Irwin Feller; and the advice of a number of
employees of the U.S. Patent Office.
1Cf.Jacob Schmookler, "The Level of Inventive Activity," Review of Economics and
Statistics,May1954.
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thereby the net profit anticipated from it; or (2) the intrinsic interest of
explorations in different fields of technology. While analytically
distinct, (1) and (2) are probably often impossible to differentiate in
practice: though an employer may finance the pursuit of an idea
because new knowledge reduces its prospective cost, his hired in-
ventors may pursue the idea mainly because they find it interesting.
The conceptual framework of the project, which is naturally subject
to change as our work progresses, is summarized in the following
diagram, in which the arrows signify "determines".
At any moment the existing state of knowledge wholly determines the
set of all conceivable inventions by definition of the latter. Since
increases in technical knowledge change the state of knowledge always,
and the state of industry often, the process described in the diagram
is continuous. It is not a closed process because other factors affect
both industry and the state of knowledge. Because it is so difficult to
get data on the variables in the interior of the diagram, we concentrate
our analysis on those on or near the boundaries—the state of know-
ledge, the state of industry, inventions and inventive activity.2
In emphasizing the role of expected benefits, changes in which are
assumed to arise from economic change, this conception of events
stands in marked contrast to that which views technological progress
exclusively as an automatic outgrowth of the state of knowledge itself.
In the latter view, the growth of technology takes on the character of a
2Wehope to give special attention, in our project but not in this paper, to the number
skilled in the art.
196CHANGES ININDUSTRYAND STATE OFKNOWLEDGE
processwhich, given some indispensable minimum institutional
framework, is largely independent of economic life.
Two variants of the latter interpretation may be distinguished.
According to the more sophisticated version, which seems implicit in
many sociological and anthropological analyses, new inventions can
be adequately explained by reference to the state of prior knowledge,
because every new invention grows out of existing knowledge, whether
that knowledge be scientific, technological, or otherwise. The more
popular version, the application of which is usually limited to recent
times, differs from the sophisticated only in that the relevant knowledge
base consists wholly of science. In this variant, therefore, new inven-
tions are considered adequately explained by reference to the scientific
discoveries from which they allegedly grow.
The persuasiveness of both variants derives from the genetic logic
evident in the history of ideas, for each new idea does build on earlier
ideas. Yet neither variant can answer two crucial questions: (1) What
determines the lag between the formation of the indispensable prior
knowledge and the emergence of the new ideas based on it? (2) Since,
one must suppose, only some of the useful ideas which could evolve
from a given knowledge base actually appear, what is the nature of the
selection process
Our central hypothesis assumes that the answers to these two
questions will be found primarily in the anticipated costs and benefits
—with risk preferences, intellectual curiosity, and purely random
factors undoubtedly also playing a part. The problem may be stated in
the parlance of traditional economics. The supply of inventions is in
a sense determined by the number of creative individuals skilled in the
technical arts, and by the state of knowledge which affects the con-
version of inventive effort into inventive output. The demand for
inventions, in turn, is presumably determined by economic conditions.
Those who, like Ogburn and his followers, have emphasized the
dependence of new inventions on the prior art to the point where the
whole process takes on an inevitable character, appear to believe that
the supply of new inventions at any moment is completely inelastic,
and that the new knowledge gained from one moment to the next
The popular variant is not only unable to answer these questions but ignores the
frequent instances in which inventive activity either flows into channels unaffected by
scientific discovery, or fails to flow into channels which have been so affected. Likewise,
it overlooks the influence of industrial technique on scientific inquiry and, like the
sophisticated variant, has no apparent regard for the effect of instrumental considerations
on the direction and level of scientific work.
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causes the supply curve to shift (exponentially) rightward. By contrast,
Giffihlan4 and the present writer5 have stressed factors on the demand
side.°
In a sense, therefore, the problem before us is the relative influence
of changes in (1) demand conditions and (2) supply conditions on the
production of inventions.
Of the variables noted affecting the supply of inventions in a field—
the number of workers skilled in the art and the state of knowledge—
we shall consider in this paper only the latter, and of the many factors
which might affect the demand for inventions we shall consider only
investment here. Obviously, any statements to be made about the
relative influence of investment and the state of knowledge apply only
to the four industries covered. Even for these industries any statements
made must be regarded as tentative.
The study of our four industries is continuing, we are studying other
industries as well, and the underlying data are not in final form. While
the patent statistics presented here are for patents counted at the time
of granting, our study will ultimately be based on patents counted at
the time of application for the patent right. Such data are superior to
those used here, which are affected by significant variations between
fields and over time in the interval between the date of application and
the date of granting. Such variations inevitably obscure the inventive
process which it is our purpose to study. Yet, the data presented below
do provide indications of the long-term trends and long swings7 (if
any) in invention in the industries covered. The highly interesting
results reported justify their use.
The findings are tentative for still another reason, however: they
traverse territory so novel that important features of the landscape
may easily escape notice. The data have been available only briefly,
S. Colum Gilfihlan, The Sociology of Invention, Chicago, 1935.
Schmookler, op. cit.
° Fora more extensive discussion of the literature in this context, cf. Richard R.
Nelson, "A Survey of the Literature on Invention," Journal of Business, April 1959.
Long swings are alternating phases of expansion and contraction, either in absolute
terms or relative to trend, whose combined duration exceeds that of business cycles, i.e.
four to eleven years. Their maximum duration is shorter than that of the trends about
which they move. They, thus, characteristically exceed a decade and may last over half a
centur. Cf. Simon Kuznets, "Long Swings in the Growth of Population and in Related
Economic Variables," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 102, No. I,
pp. 25—52; Moses Abramovitz, "Long Swings in U.S. Economic Growth," and Richard
A. Easterlin, "Long Swings in the Growth of Population and Labor Force," in The Study
of Economic Growth, National Bureau of Economic Research, Thirty-ninth Annual
Report, New York, 1959, pp. 23—27 and 27—30, respectively.
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and further study and the consideration of other variables may well
reveal significant characteristics as yet unobserved.
Subject to the foregoing qualifications the evidence presented below
suggests the following: (1) The trends and long swings in patented
invention tend to match those in investment. (2) Both investment and
invention quite clearly move together with prospective profits in rail-
roading, the only industry for which we have an index of the latter.
(3) There is some tendency for important inventions to lead run-of-
the-mill inventions, but this tendency is slight and its significance is
unclear. (4) Scientific discoveries played no appreciable and obvious
role in triggering important inventions in our four industries. How-
ever, scientific discoveries undoubtedly sometimes played a permissive
role, particularly in the case of petroleum refining and papermaking
inventions, many of which necessarily depended on the growth of
chemical science. Moreover, if plant improvements, e.g., hybrid corn,
were included in our list of important agricultural inventions, the
triggering effect of scientific discoveries might seem greater than our
present evidence suggests.
Important Inventions, Run-of-the-Mill Inventions,
and In vestment in the Railroad Industry
Because our economic data are most complete and the case seems
clearest for railroading, we consider it first. Chart 1 shows the course of
railroad stock prices, capital formation, and patents. The patents
cover equipment and structures. The stock prices have been adjusted
for changes in the general level of wholesale prices.8 Net additions to
road are taken as representative of capital formation during the early
years when a more suitable index is not available.9 These three
variables are shown as seven-year moving averages. Gross capital
formation is presented in the same form as in the source, i.e., as a
five-year moving average.
The general impression conveyed by Chart 1 is unmistakable. The
trends and long swings in railroad stock prices, capital fonnation, and
patenting are very similar. Net additions to miles of road decline from
8Ifrailroad stock prices were adjusted for changes in the general level of stock prices,
or not adjusted at all, the net impression created would be much the same.
°Cf.Melville J. Ulmer, Trends and Cycles in Capital Formation by United Slates
Railroads, 1870—1950, Occasional Paper 43, New York, NBER, 1954, P. 54, which
suggests, by implication at least, that this series is a tolerable indicator of capital formation
in this period.
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Railroad Stock Prices, Capital Formation, and Patents
SOURCE: Gross railroad capital formation in 1929 prices: Melville J. Ulmer, Trends and
Cycles in Capital Formation by United States Railroads, 1870—1950, Occasional Paper 43,
New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1954, Table A-I. Net additions to
miles of road: calculated from Historic! Statistics of the United States, Series K-I. The
"real" price of railroad stocks: calculated by taking stock prices from F. R. Macauley,
Some Theoretical Problems Suggested by Interest Rates, Bond Yields, and Stock Prices in the
United States Since 1856, New York, NBER, 1938, App. Table 10; and from Moody's
Transportation Manual, 1959, p. a3; and adjusting for changes in the BLS index of whole-
sale prices, Historical Statistics, Series L-15, and Statistical Abstract of the United States,
1959.
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1839 to 1845. Patents granted decline from the start in 1840 to 1845.
Both series then rise rapidly after 1845, with additions to road suffering
a check in the rate of climb from 1850 to 1851 and patents declining
absolutely in 1852—53. After a further rise additions to road decline
absolutely from 1855 through 1863, while patents undergo marked
retardation in the rate of climb from 1857 to 1863.
Rail stock prices begin rising in 1additions to road and patents,
in 1863. Additions to road reach a peak in 1870, stock prices in 1873,
and patents in about 1875. Stock prices start rising again in 1875,
capital formation in 1876, and patents in 1877. The next set of peaks
are difficult to locate. In investment, in fact, there are two peaks. Stock
prices appear to reach their high in 1889, capital formation in 1891,
and patents in 1892. Stock prices then reach a trough between 1891
and 1893, capital formation in 1897, and patents in 1898. The next
series of peaks, which happen also to constitute all-time highs, occur
in 1908 in stock prices, 1911 in capital formation, and 1912 in patents.
Stock prices, which generally led during the trend expansion, move
into second place or tie for third during the trend contraction. Capital
formation reaches a low in 1917—20, stocks in 1920, and patents in
1921. Capital formation then moves to a high in 1925, with stock
prices and patents reaching their highs in 1928. Capital formation then
falls to a low in 1933—34, stocks in 1935, and patents in 1936, with both
of the latter falling thereafter but at a slower rate. The subsequent
timing relations are not clear, perhaps because the recent swings are
incomplete.'0
One of the striking features of the relation between railroad patents
and the other variables shown in Chart 1 is its substantial invariance
over the whole period. During a century in which inventive activity itself
changed drastically, and in which the railroad industry moved from an
unregulated to a regulated status and from growth to decline, patents
continued to rise and fall with the level of railroad investment and
expected profit as represented by stock prices.
What is the explanation of this striking phenomenon, this covaria-
tion of patents, investment, and expected profits? Clearly, the rise of
highway transportation explains the long-term decline which began
around 1910 in all three railroad variables. With the growth of rival
forms of transportation, investors and inventors simply turned to
more remunerative fields. Thus, in a sense, one might argue, a major
10Obviously,if trends were eliminated the timing estimates might change somewhat,
but not enough to affect the general picture of synchronization of movement.
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invention, the automobile with its variants—the truck and bus—was
responsible for the secular decline of railroad investment, invention,
and stock prices. (We shall discuss this argument later.) This argument
provides us with a clue to a possible and obvious line of further inquiry:
Can it be that the long swings in railroad stock prices and investment
also reflect the implementation of railroad inventions, just as the
secular decline in railroad investment reflects the implementation of a
major rival invention? In short, are the waves of railroad investment
generated by the waves of railroad invention? Thi.s is a natural
question, and we shall consider it first.
The first point to note is that the long swing turning points in patents
generally lagged from one to three years behind the turning points in
the two capital formation series. Only at the two earliest troughs, 1845
and 1863, did patents manage to turn as early as investment. Since the
interval between application and granting of patents was generally
about a year or less before World War I, and about two years in the
interwar period, and since our investment data pertain to installations,
not decisions, the most that can be plausibly inferred from the data
is that the long swings in railroad inventing and patenting coincided
with those in railroad investing. This suggests that whatever effect the
waves of potentially useful invention had on the concurrent waves of
investment was probably superimposed on the latter and not a cause
of them.
Conceivably, however, a given swing in invention could cause the
next swing in investment. Yet, if this is the case, why do the trend
peaks in both variables occur practically simultaneously? If a given
swing in invention causes the next swing in investment, the all-time
high in investment should have come in the 1920's, not around 1910.
Secondly, according to this hypothesis one would expect variations in
the duration of the swings in invention to reappear, with a lag of one
cycle, in the swings of investment. Yet, Table 1 shows duration of a
swing in invention is usually more like that of its companion swing in
investment than like that of the next swing in investment.
Inspection of the table reveals that in only one case, Cycle III in
patents, is a given patent cycle matched as well by the next investment
cycle as by its companion investment cycle. Thus Cycle III lasts 21
years in patents and 23 years in investment, compared to 19 years in
Cycle IV in investment. In the other four cases, the duration of each
patent cycle is much closer to that of the concurrent cycle in investment
than to the succeeding cycle of the latter.
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1 1845 1845 18 18
II 1863 1863 14 13
III 1877 1876 21 23
IV 1898 1899 23 19
V 1921 1918 15 17
VI 1936 1935
SouRcE: Patents: Chart 2. Cycles I and II in capital formation: from net additions
to miles of road in Chart 2. The timing of subsequent cycles in capital formation is for
nine-year moving averages of the same presented in Melville J. Ulmer, Capital in
Transportation, Communications, and Public Utilities (Princeton University Press for
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1960), p. 120. Using the timing indicated by
Chart 2 for all the cycles would not affect the results.
Given the simultaneous trend peaks and the good matching of
durations of simultaneously matched long swings, the evidential basis
for the hypothesis that a given swing in invention causes the next
swing in investment does not seem strong. Moreover, since the waves
in patents either coincide with, or lag behind, the waves in investment,
the notion that a given wave in invention causes the companion wave
in investment likewise seems rather improbable.
The next point along this line of inquiry is plain. Inventions,
obviously, are not all the same. While the swings in investment were
apparently not responsive to the swings in invention generally, were
they generated by waves of important inventions?
Chart 2 provides us with a basis for answering this question tenta-
tively. As part of our project we compiled a chronology of about 250
of the most important railroad inventions made since 1800. Unlike the
inventions covered by our patents, these are dated, so far as possible,
at the time the inventions were actually made. They are shown in the
Chart, starting with 1826, in the form of nine-year moving totals. The
heroic, if not foolish, act of marking off long swings in this series,
which from 1870 to 1938 fluctuates between 10 and 19, was performed
in order to, and in such a fashion as to, give the hypothesis the most
favorable "test" within the stringent limitations imposed by this whole
approach. The long swings in the two capital formation series were
used as a guide in determining the swings in important inventions, and
whenever a choice existed in selecting turning points, doubts were
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CHART2
Important Inventions and Investment in Railroading
SOURCE: Gross railroad capital formation in
portation, Communications, and Public Utilities: Its
NBER, 1960. Table K-2. Net additions to miles of
204
1929 prices: Ulmer, Capital in Trans-
Formation and Financing, Princeton for
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example, a trough in important inventions was dated in 1894 instead of
1898, and a peak dated in 1927 instead of 1934, though the later dates
would have been perhaps more defensible. Again, by dividing in two
the major swing in capital formation from the middle 1870's to the
late 1890's and recognizing thereby the small decline from 1884 to
1887 in that series, two instances were created in which the important
invention series lead.
Given the limitations imposed by our data and general approach,
the hypothesis that long swings in important inventions generate
similar movements in capital formation could hardly receive more
advantageous treatment. The results are summarized in Table 2. At
TABLE 2




INVENTIONS FORMATIONS Inventions Formation
CYCLETroughPeak TroughPeakTroughPeakTroughPeak
I 1847 1855 1845 1855 2 1.5 1 1.5
II 1865 1870 1863 1870 2 1.5 1 1.5
lilA1879 1883 1876 1884 2 1 1 2
I1IB 1884 1889 1887 1890 1 1 2 2
IV 1894 1908 1899 19(0 1 1 2 2
V 1917 1927 1918 1926 1 2 2 1
VI 1942+ ? 1935 1949" 2 2 1 1
MEAN RANK AT TURNING POINTS 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.6
SouRcE: seeChart 3.
aThetiming through 1870 is derived from seven-year moving averages of net
additions to miles of road. After 1870 it is derived from 9-year moving averages of
gross capital formation in 1929 dollars.
"Estimate of Ulmer based on annual data (Melville J. Ulmer, Capital in Trans-
portation, Com,nunications, and Public Utilities, Princeton University Press for National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1960, Table 39, p. 125).
thetroughs, the important invention series lags four times and leads
three times. At the peaks, the important invention series lags twice,
leads three times, and ties for the lead twice. The mean rank at the
troughs is 1.6 for the important inventions, compared with 1.4 for
capital formation. At the peaks, these mean ranks are reversed. Even
if we ignore the fact that the test was rigged in its favor, the hypothesis
receives little support from this evidence. On the contrary, to the degree
that the swings in the important invention series are bona fide, they
seem to be synchronized with those in investment as much as are those
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in railroad invention generally. (We recognize, of course, that the
fundamental inventions which establish an industry—in this case
made almost entirely abroad—must come first. Our discussion here is
limited to the later important inventions.)
A legitimate objection to this conclusion is that our analysis, while
taking into account important inventions, has failed to differentiate
among them. Conceivably, when properly weighted in terms of
economic potential, the important inventions would be found to lead
the investment swings. This possibility is given consideration next,
although obviously full consideration could be given to it only by a
much more extensive investigation.
Bruschke, who prepared the chronology of important railroad in-
ventions, undertook to determine the 100mostimportant among
them. He then ranked this more select group according to two criteria:
economic importance and technological importance." (The distinction
between the two arises from the fact that an invention, whether or not
it has an appreciable economic impact, may lead to other economically
important inventions. Inventions possessing this seminal quality were
designated as technologically important.) Thus, each invention was
assigned a rank running from I to 100 under each standard, the more
important inventions under each standard being assigned the higher
numbers.
The ranks under each criterion were summed for overlapping
decades with results as shown in Chart 3. Given the lack of anything
like adequate data for fixing a firm value for each invention in each
category, the results are, of course, based only on impressions from the
literature and are only suggestive. The general impression conveyed
by the chart is that, on the whole, it makes little difference whether the
inventions are weighted or unweighted, or whether they are weighted
according to their economic or technological importance.'2 Moreover,
when weighting does make a difference, it postpones turning points by
about five years. Possibly a weighting scheme which ran from 1 to
1,000 or 1 to 1,000,000 would have altered the picture but Bruschke did
not think so. Finally, as with the patent series, the duration of a given
swing in the important invention series bears no special relation to the
duration of the next swing in investment.
11Thesecorrespond to two of the dimensions of an invention discussed in Kuznets'
paper in this volume.
12Theseconclusions are confirmed by similar operations performed on the 100most
important inventions in petroleum refining and papermaking, respectively. We have not
attempted to weight the important farm inventions.












Hundred"Most Important" Railroad Inventions, Overlapping
Decade Totals, 1803—1957
In short, there is little present basis for assuming that the waves of
minor or major inventions, once the industry is established, cause the
swings in railroad investment, either immediately or with a lag. Of
course, this does not mean that the major and minor railroad inven-
tions had no effect on railroad investment. Presumably, really useful
inventions go through, first, a period of increasing use as their value
becomes known, initial defects are eliminated, and occasions for
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adoption arise; and then, a period of declining use as superior in-
ventions or changed economic conditions make them obsolete. If this
"life cycle" of an invention is approximately correct, then investments
embodying the inventions probably follow a similar pattern. Other
inventions may, of course, never be used, or used only until fatal
defects are revealed in practice. The pattern of investment in inventions
of the latter sort presumably is one of swift decline from a low initial
level. These patterns, however, apply only to investment embodying
specific inventions. The effect of these inventions on the aggregate level
of investment is indeterminate a priori, for the expansion of invest-
ment embodying a given invention obviously may depress total
investment in the industry below what it would otherwise have been.
If the foregoing is correct, the association between the waves of
investment and invention in the railroad industry would appear to be
of two sorts. On the one hand, either the waves of investment induce
the waves of invention, or both variables respond to the same external
forces. On the other hand, the waves of investment provide the
occasion for the introduction and diffusion of inventions, new and
old.'3 But the introduction and diffusion of inventions in the industry
seem merely to accompany but notcause the waves of investment.
One important implication of the failure of important inventions to
lead investment is that, once past the fundamental pioneer inventions,
at least, important inventions also fail to lead the run-of-the-mill
inventions which dominate the patent statistics. Indeed, a comparison
between the trough dates of patents in Table 1 and the corresponding
dates of important inventions in Table 2 shows that patents lead in
four long swings while important inventions lead only in two. This
does not mean that the minor inventions did not build on the major
ones—or vice versa, for that matter. It does suggest that the timing of
such "building" was governed by the factors that controlled the general
level of inventive activity in the industry, and not by factors arising
directly out of the growth of knowledge. In short, the role of changes
in the state of knowledge as a determinant of inventive activity in this
industry does not seem overwhelming, if the number of either major or
minor inventions or both are taken as representing changes in the
state of knowledge.
The proposition that the swings in railroad investment are not
Thatinvestment constitutes either innovation or diffusion of new or old inventions
is, obviously, little more than a truism. Each kind of equipment must have been invented
sometime. (Only when a worn-out machine is replaced by an identical one can we say
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CHART 4













SOURCE: Net change in New York railroad ton-miles: calculated from Historiol
Statistics of the United States, Series K-169. change in railroad labor force: cakulated
from Harold Barger, The Transportation Industries, 1889—1946: Output, Employment, and
Productivity, New York, NBER, 1951, Table B-i; and from Statistical Abstract of the
United States. Net changes in output: calculated from Ulmer, Capital in Transportation,
Communications, and Public Utilities ..., Table 1-13.
causedby invention and innovation is supported by careful students
of the phenomenon. Thus, Ulmer writes, "Second—and more im-
portant—it seems impossible to provide an explanation for each of
the three and one-half swings during the 1870—1950 period in terms of
specific transportation innovations."14
14 Ulmer,op. cit., p. 137.
in this quotation, which is
However, he identifies two
Table 39, p. 125).
Ulmer treats the period from 1876 to 1899 as one long swing
based on his data in the form of nine-year moving averages.




































Net change in total railroad labor force
(9—year moving average)
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Similarly, Cootner writes, "The key railroad innovations were
adopted in response to explicit economic demands. The railroad
investment... wasspecifically motivated by the growth of industrial
requirements, and that motivation was repeated in the early sixties and
eighties, while building in the fifties and in the post-Civil War period
was induced by the need for the expansion of primary production."5
Cootner's suggestion that the long swings in railroad investment arose
from the ebb and flow of pressure on railroad capacity is borne out by
the fact that long swings in the rate of growth of gross national product
precede by a few years those in railroad investment.'6 It is further
supported by the fact that major peaks and troughs in net additions to
railroad output and to railroad labor force generally occur one to
seven years before the long-swing peaks and troughs, respectively, in
railroad investment, as shown in Chart 4.
While changes in output and labor force are not nearly as smooth as
are those in investment, and the existence of long swings in the former
two variables is debatable, the evidence that changes in output and
labor force lead changes in capital stock nonetheless seems clear. The
long-swing peaks and troughs marked off in these two series are com-
pared in Table 3 with the related dates in bapital formation.
Whether or not long swings exist in changes in railroad labor force
and output is probably not important. That these variables exhibit
major peaks and troughs well ahead of the long-swing peaks and
troughs in railroad investment probably is important, however. A
major peak in additions to output implies impending or actual pressure
on capacity and therefore a rising incentive to invest. By the same
token, a major trough in additions to output is a signal to reduce the
rate of investment. That the waves in investment are not nearly as
choppy as are those in increments to output and employment probably
results from the character of the investment process in the industry.'7
The trend and long swings in railroad investment are, therefore,
probably not caused by the trend and long swings in railroad invention.
If this is correct, then the similarity between the two variables must be
explained either by (1) a highly improbable degree of coincidence, (2)
a tendency for variations in investment in the industry to induce
corresponding variations in invention, or (3) a tendency for inventors
Paul H. Cootner, "Transport Innovation and Economic Development," Un-
published Ph.D. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1953, Ch. IX, p. 4 of
azograph copy kindly supplied by Mr. Cootner.
'°Cf.Ulmer, op. CII.,Table44, p. 133.
Cf. Ulmer, op. cit., p. 140.
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TABLE 3
MAJOR PEAKS ANDT*OUGHSIN CHANGES IN RAILROAD OUTPUT
(oR LABOR FORCE) AND CAPITAL FORMATION
Lag of Capital Formation
Behind Changes in Output
Changes inOutput Capital (or LaborForce)
(or LaborForce) Formation (years)











lilA 1874 1878 1876 1884 2 6
IIIB 1883 1889 1887 1890 4 1




VI 1928 1940 1935 1949 7 9
SOURCE: Cots. (I) and (2): Chart 5. Dates shown are from output through 1892,
from labor force thereafter. Cols. (3) and (4): Table 2.
aThe firstfigure is the interval between the date for capital formation and that for
Cycle VIB in labor force. The second figure is for the interval between the former and
that for Cycle VIA in the labor force.
to respond similarly to the conditions which govern investment. The
first explanation can be rejected not only on the basis of the evidence
presented for this industry but also in the light of the evidence to follow
for other industries.
Whether invention responds primarily to investment or to the con-
ditions which govern the latter cannot be determined yet for lack of
evidence. Whichever explanation is ultimately accepted will have to
apply to the activities of independent and captive inventors alike, for
the association between investment and invention is observable when
first one and then the other was predominant.
Perhaps clues to the nature of the association can be found in two
elementary facts. First, investment in the railroad industry consists of
sales—by the railroad equipment makers and the construction in-
dustry. Second, independent inventors, for whom invention is general-
ly an avocation rather than a vocation, do their inventing when they
encounter, or hear of, a technical condition which dissatisfies them and
which they think they can remedy. (These two properties identify the
potential inventor.) We may, therefore, surmise that the timing
relations between invention and investment arise from circumstances
connected with either (1) the identification of a technical problem, or
(2) the activity of remedying the problem, or both.
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The identification of a problem can occur at any time during the use,
or observation of the use, of an article or piece of equipment. And the
man with an irrepressible urge to improve things may, without any
special economic motivation, begin inventing as soon as he "recog-
nizes" the problem. The problem may be solved in minutes. In this
case—except for the circumstances to be noted later—there need be no
association between the given act of invention and the level of invest-
ment. On the other hand, as often happens, the solution may take
years. In the latter case, the internal drive is likely to slacken and the
work put aside and taken up time and again. Under these circum-
stances, economic motives (or the desire for the recognition which
economic success brings) are likely to become relatively more powerful
as the first surge of enthusiasm wanes. Now, if sales of the product the
inventor wishes to improve are high, he is likely to push harder to
finish his improvement and make money from it, while if sales are low,
his efforts may subside. Thus, there will tend to be some positive
correlation between the sales of a product and the timing of difficult
improvements, even when the initial stimulus to the inventor was non-
economic.
Moreover, prolific but equally irrepressible inventors may have
several problems with half-finished solutions in their minds. And
while their underlying drives may also be noneconomic, it seems
reasonable to suppose that the economic prospects of the different
incomplete inventions will affect the direction of their efforts, other
things being equal.'8
In addition to this tendency for the solution of technical problems
to be stimulated or inhibited by the level of sales of the products
involved, there is the possibility that the very recognition of a problem
—the initial stimulus to invention—may come when the inventor or an
acquaintance of his is shopping for the article which later becomes the
object of the inventor's efforts. This may happen particularly if the
article turns out to be (1) more costly than anticipated or (2) lacking in
18Followingthe same line of reasoning, there will be tendencies for (1) the proportion
of inventions patented to rise and fall with the industry's sales, and (2) inventors to try to
juggle the issue dates of their patents in accord with the state of business. Of course, these
tendencies cannot account for the marked trend of the railroad patents. The possible
effect of (2) will be eliminated from our data for the period beginning with 1874 when
application dates rather than granting dates will provide the basis of the time series. (1)
creates the real possibility that minor deviations about the trend reflect changes in
patenting rates and not changes in inventing. However, since the economic incentives to
invent are the same as the incentives to patent, appreciable movements in patenting—
including appreciable deviations about trend—should ordinarily be construed as re-
flecting movements of invention in the same direction.
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performance requirements of the customer. If the article is too
expensive, the price itself may make the inventor feel he can design a
cheaper one. If his requirements are more exacting than can be met by
the product already on the market, he may feel he can design a better
one." If these surmises are correct, the number of dissatisfied cus-
tomers may tend to vary directly with the volume of an industry's
sales—with the result that the amount of inventing may rise and fall
with sales.
The foregoing conjectures are transferable to the activities of captive
inventors. The economic considerations which are perhaps marginal
with independent inventors become central in the calculations of
businessmen. The common corporate practice of setting research and
development budgets at a fixed percentage of sales practically assures
a high correlation between invention and sales. Far from being a mere
convention, this practice has an intelligent rationale, part of which is
that inventing a given improvement in the firm's product will entail a
certain expected cost which is unrelated to the product's sales volume,
and will probably increase the firm's market share by a given per-
centage. Hence, if the industry's sales are high, the absolute amount
resulting from an enlarged market may be great enough to warrant the
cost of the invention, and the project will be pursued. But if the in-
dustry's sales are low, the increase in the relative market share may
promise a revenue from the invention that is too small to justify the
project. In addition to these considerations, the higher the firm's sales,
other things being equal, the more it can afford research and the
farther ahead it can plan, by means of research and other activities.
The general relation of the foregoing to the association between
investment and invention in railroading seems clear, but how much is
fancy and how much fact remains to be determined. As indicated
above, investment in the railroad industry consists primarily of sales
to it by the equipment and construction industries. The independent
inventors presumably are both railroad employees and outsiders; the
captive inventors, the engineers and research men of the locomotive
and car companies, rail manufacturers, etc. Some technical problems
arose or were recognized in the daily operation of the business, and
independents or representatives of sl4ppliers tried to solve them. When
equipment purchases were high these efforts were increased—partly
19Alternatively,recognition of the problem may come before shopping begins, but
the decision to solve it inventively may not be made until the inventor discovers that none
of the goods on the market constitute a solution.
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because, from the buyer's standpoint, the problems would be longer-
lived if incorporated in brand-new equipment, partly because the
problems may have been recognized for the first time when the very
expensive purchases were being considered, and partly because it
would be most profitable for the seller to solve the problems then.
Two other considerations may be mentioned relating to the possible
timing of the inventor's recognition of the problem to be solved. We
noted earlier that increments to output and labor force tended to lead
increments to plant by several years. Conceivably, technical problems
may be created by the changing capital-output and capital-labor
ratios which result. Particularly, a fall in either or both of these ratios
below a certain minimum (which, of course, changes with changes in
the technique of production) would indicate a strain on plant capacity,
a condition which might stimulate some to invent improvements to
relieve the pressure on capacity. This would assume a lag of several
years between the recognition of the problem and the completion of
the invention—a lag as long as that between the pressure on capacity
and the consequent increase in capacity represented by the upturn in
investment which coincides with the upturn in patenting.
A somewhat different timing in recognizing the problem to be solved
is suggested by the presumption, suggested previously, that the waves
of investment in the industry determine the timing of waves of in-
novation and diffusion. If this is correct, one would expect that the new
equipment introduced during expansion will exhibit defects under
special, local circumstances, or otherwise evoke dissatisfaction in the
breasts of inventive men. Thus, the hypothesized environment of
relatively rapid technical change may stimulate invention among those
who make, sell, use, or service the new equipment. The dispropor-
tionately large contribution of "new men" or outsiders—Quakers,
Huguenots, etc.—to invention 4nd innovation has been noted by
scholars in the past. The proposition here is the other side of the
coin—a changing environment can make new men out of old ones. In
this case, inventing and patenting these inventions takes little time,
given the similarity of timing between the swings in investment and
those in patenting.
In both cases supposed in the preceding two paragraphs, recognition
of the problem to be solved is associated with the level of investment in
some way. In the first case, it is the low level of the latter relative to
increments in output or labor. In the second case, it is the high level of
investment with the high rate of technical change assumed to be
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associated with it. How serious these possibilities or the alternative
possibility that the problem tends to be identified when the purchase
is under consideration may be, we do not know. Moreover, in an
industry as large as railroading inventors probably are continually
recognizing problems. The question then is presumably one of the
relative frequency of each kind of timing and not whether one kind
exists and the others do not.
The one argument which seems persuasive, at present, is that the
prospective profit from invention tends to vary with equipment
purchases and construction, i.e. with the sales of the product being
improved, so that regardless of when the idea was conceived, an
inventor—or the firm employing him—will tend to press for a solution
when sales are high and slacken his efforts when sales are low. (While
an inventor could still profit, even if the industry planned to invest
nothing, by making such a drastic improvement that, for a given level
of output, the total cost with his invention would be lower than the
total variable cost with existing installations, this is stacking the cards
against himself. His task is much less demanding, especially in a high
fixed-cost industry like railroading, when the industry is buying
equipment anyway. In this case, total production costs with his
invention need only be less than total costs with other new equipment.)
Let us now try to summarize what can be said at present about the
relation of invention and investment in the railroad industry. (1) The
trend and swings in invention probably do not cause the trend and
concurrent swings in investment. (2) A given swing in invention does
not constitute the cause of the next swing in investment. These tentative
judgments seem as valid for major railroad inventions as for run-of-
the-mill inventions. (3) Rather, the trend and swings in railroad
investment appear to reflect, fundamentally, the industry's response
to changes in the demand for railroad service. This statement, of
course, applies to the industry only after the pioneer inventions
essential to its establishment have been made. (4) The trend and swings
of invention are probably caused in some fashion by those in invest-
ment or by the same forces which dominate the latter.
The next question we may ask is whether the concordance between
invention and investment found in the railroad industry exists in other
industries as well. The other industries for which we have data are
petroleum refining, papermaking, and farming, and we turn to them
next.
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In vestment, and Important and Run-of-the-Mill Inventions
in Petroleum Refining, Papermaking, and Farming
Comparisons of the sort presented for the railroad industry are, for
the present at least, impossible for the other three industries because
the necessary data on investment are lacking. What we have instead
are estimates of annual rates of net investment between several dates.
Given the kind of reasoning developed in the preceding section, gross
investment seems by far the more relevant variable. However, since
the direction of change is likely to be the same for net as for gross
investment, we can still gain some impression of whether or not gross
investment and invention rise and fall together in these industries as
in railroading.
A more serious difficulty is that our estimates of annual net invest-
ment cover only nine time intervals in petroleum refining and paper-
making, and only eleven intervals in farming. Moreover, five of the
intervals in the two manufacturing industries are approximately
decades, and only four are for quinquennia. Hence, impressions as to
long swings generally cannot be formed. In farming, five are for
decades, and six are for quinquennia, which is a little better. Another
consequence of this type of data is that the resulting values naturally
must be plotted at the mid-points of the intervals to which they relate
and this creates at least one serious distortion for petroleum refining
and papermaking. Specifically, the annual rate of investment from
1919 to 1929 is plotted at 1924, and the rate from 1929 to 1937 is
plotted at 1933—34. As might be expected, an impression of a great
decline in investment from 1924 to 1933—34 is conveyed. Yet the true
peak in investment even for, say, a seven-year moving average,
probably occurred in these industries sometime around 1927—29.
The comparison between invention and investment for these
industries is further distorted by the increased lag between application
for and granting of patents which occurred after World War I, at
least in rapidly growing fields like petroleum refining and paper-
making. Preliminary studies show that in the early 1930's, the average
lag was about four and one-half years in petroleum refining. The lag in
papermaking patents, at least for chemical inventions, was probably
comparable. When our data have been converted to an application
date basis, this difficulty will be eliminated.
With these precautionary statements in mind, we turn to Chart 5
which shows the course of patents, net investment, and important
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SOURCE: Net capital formation: calculated
and Israel Borenstein, with the assistance
Manufacturing and Mining: Its Formation and
A-I.
from Daniel Creamer. Sergei Dobrovolsky,
of Martin Bernstein, Capital Formation in
Financing, Princeton for NBER. 1960, Table
inventionsin petroleum refining.The two invention seriesapply
almost entirely to process and equipment inventions. The number of
product inventions covered is trivial. The most important single im-
pression from the chart is that all three variables show two distinct
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growth cycles—the first associated with the kerosene stage of the
industry and the second, with the gasoline stage. The presence of these
two growth cycles is clearly indicated in both invention series. In the
case of patents the second cycle of growth appears to start at about
1908. In the case of the important inventions, the start of the second
cycle could be either 1895 when the series reaches a low point, or about
1904 when it returns to approximately the same trend level as had
characterized it earlier. The existence of two distinct growth phases in
the investment series can reasonably be inferred, since investment
must have risen rapidly after Drake's well in 1859 and then levelled off
until the demand for gasoline began to swell with the coming of the
automobile. The assumption of a second growth cycle is supported by
an absolute decline in investment from t.he 1880's to the 1890's,
followed first by a recovery to the old level, and then by a sharp rise
after 1906—07. The second growth phase in investment thus began
probably in the 1900's, when the gasoline powered automobile came
on the scene in large numbers.
if we divide the secular movements in the three variables into rapid
growth and retardation (flat or falling trend) phases for each growth
cycle, the order of secular turning points seems to be as follows:
Start of first phase of rapid growth. important inventions (before
1840), run-of-the-mill inventions (c. 1850), investment (1859)
Start of first retardation phase: important inventions (1864—71),
run-of-the-mill inventions (1868), investment (unknown)
Start of second phase of rapid gr6wth: important inventions (1895—
1904), investment (1900's), run-of-the-mill inventions (1908)
Start of second retardation phase: investment (late 1920's), run-of-
the-mill inventions (late 1920's), important inventions (late 1930's)2°
It seems clear that important inventions led run-of-the-mill inven-
tions at two out of four of the secular turning points, while lagging
behind at the last one. It is, moreover, inevitabJe that important
inventions led investment during the phase of rapid growth in the first
growth cycle. On the other hand, at the start of the second retardation
phase, investment led at least the important invention series, and it is
not clear whether investment led or lagged behind the important
invention series at the start of the second phase of rapid growth. in
any case, the important invention which "caused" the second phase
of rapid growth in refining investment was obviously the internal-
20Thetiming indicated for investment and run-of-the-mill inventions reflects con-
sideration of the factors discussed earlier in this section.
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combustion engine (and its diffusion), and not the refining inventions
per Se.
Given the nature of our data, no possibility exists for detecting long
swings, if such exist, in investment. However, the 1890's and the 1930's
were periods of subnormal investment, and there seem to have been
more or less matching declines in both invention series. Marking off
long swings in the invention series is neither easy nor necessarily
warranted. Neither invention series exhibits the smooth variation
characteristic of the railroad patents. Hence, such variation about the
trend as exists may be largely random or a reflection of changed
patenting propensities. In the first growth cycle there is, however,
some suggestion that fluctuations in important inventions led those in
run-of-the-mill inventions, and this impression tends to carry over
until, but not including, the second retardation phase in the 1930's.
Yet, given the low amplitude of most of these fluctuations about trend,
attributing any statistical significance, let alone causal association, to
this weak pattern seems hazardous at this stage.
In brief, in petroleum refining two successive growth cycles probably
occurred in each variable. As might be expected, important inventions
led the other two variables during the first phase of rapid growth, but
they lagged in the last phase of retardation. These are the only timing
relations we can be sure of at present. Since the entire first growth
cycle in each variable was induced by the rising demand for illumi-
nants2' and kerosene in particular, and the second, by the rising
demand for gasoline, the pattern of responsiveness of investment and
invention to underlying demand conditions suggested in the preceding
section on the railroad industry appears to have been repeated here.
The situation in farming is shown in Chart 6 where, because during
two quinquennia net disinvestment occurred, it has been necessary to
use an arithmetic scale. The important inventions22 presented are
restricted to mechanical equipment in order to make them comparable
with the inventions represented by the patent statistics. Thus, im-
portant agricultural advances like hybrid corn are left out. For the
same reason, the investment data pertain only to implements and
machinery and not to farm real estate, livestock, or inventories.
The free wheeling, not overly critical imagination can find many
21Cf.H. R. Williamson and A. R. Daum, The American Peiroleum Indusiry, Evanston,
1959, Chaps. 2—5.
22Makersof important farm inventions, unlike inventors in the other industries, were
primarily American from the start. In the other industries Americans dominated after






















SOURCE: Net capital formation calculated from Alvin S. Tostlebe, Capita! in Agri-
culture: Its Formation and Financing Since 1900, Princeton for NBER, 1957, Table G-1.
suggestivephenomena in Chart 6. Two long-term growth cycles in
important inventions, the first ending and the second beginning in
1907, seem fairly clear. The first of these could be the cause of the
entire movement in the run-of-the-mill inventions reflected in the
patent statistics. This is, in one sense, not a very remote possibility
since many of the latter are made by farmers who may not be abreast of
the industry's needs and technology, as well as by equipment makers
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who presumably are more up-to-date. On the other hand, the deep
decline of agricultural patenting in the 1890's suggests that perhaps
there were two long-term growth cycles in this series, too. If so, while
important inventions led run-of-the-mill inventions in the first growth
cycle, run-of-the-mill inventions led the important ones in the second
cycle. The long swings in the patent series seem quite pronounced, and
while this seems also to be the case with the important invention
series, the fact that only about 150 items appear in the latter (far fewer
than in the comparable series for our other three industries), or
slightly less than one per year, should make us treat the minor fluctua-
tions in this variable with considerable skepticism. Be that as it may,
except for the obvious lead of important over run-of-the-mill inven-
tions at the outset, the timing relations between the two are not
constant. Only some kind of content analysis of the inventions in-
volved seems likely to disclose the kind and degree of interdependence
of the two series.
The investment-invention relationship, however, seems more stable
in some respects, and indeed is like that found earlier in railroading.
Until 1920 the investment data are only for decade intervals, but the
trend is upward like that in patents.23 After 1915, however, the trend of
patents is downward, while that of investment is generally rising,
despite big drops. On the other hand, with quinquennial average
rates of investment available after 1920 we can compare the long
swings in the variables, and these are similar. Starting with a peak in
1915 in patents and in 19 10—20 in investment, we have next a trough in
investment in 1920—25 and in patents in 1925; a peak in investment in
1925—30 and in patents in 1929; a trough in investment in 1930—35 and
in patents in 1937; and finally, a peak in investment in 1940—45 and in
patents around 1941. Interestingly enough, at the last three turning
points the important invention series seems to lead, with dates at
1926, 1930, and 1939. However, the low level of farm investment in the
early 1930's certainly reflected the depression, and the high level in the
early 1940's, war-time demand and labor shortage, and not the
changing rate of important inventions.
The same variables in papermaking are shown in Chart 7. Equip-
ment, processes, and products are all reflected in the two invention
series. When the data are decomposed, this combination may prove
23Thisremark applies only to the trend in investment in implements and machinery.
The trend for total farm investment was down during the period, and the fluctuations in
it run directly counter to those in farm patents. Starting with 1910—20, investment in
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SOURCE: For net capital formation, same as for Chart 6.
tohave been a mistake. In particular, we do not yet know what the
timing pattern is between improvements on products and improve-
ments on the machines that make them. Since the investment series
pertains by definition to plant and equipment, it would have been
preferable, in the light of the discussion in the previous section, to have
had a separate series on equipment inventions.
The over-all impression conveyed by Chart 7 is that the trends in
investing and general inventing were similar in timing and direction.
This statement is made on the basis of the contentions advanced
earlier in this section that the all-time peak in investment occurred not
in the early but in the late 1920's, and that the all-time peak in run-of-
the-mill inventions occurred not in the early 1930's but in the late
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1920's. If these arguments are correct, then on the whole patents rose
when investment rose and declined when investment declined. On the
other hand, it is doubtful that the bulge in patenting from about 1910
to 1920 is tied to the earlier bulge in investment from 1899—1904 to
1909—14, for the average lag between application for and granting of
patents then could hardly have been ten or eleven years.
In addition, the long swings in important papermaking inventions
seem similar to later movements in the patent series. Conceivably, the
first phase in patenting ending in 1895 was associated with the rise and
fall in important inventions from 1845 to about 1869; the period of
steady rise in patenting from 1895 to about 1910 with the nearly
stationary level of important inventions between 1870 and 1903; the
patent swing from 1910 to 1920 with the swing in important inventions
from 1903 to 1915; and the patent swing from 1920 to 1947 with the
swing in important inventions from 1915 to the close. Obviously,
however, whether the temporal association between the run-of-the-mill
inventions and the important ones is that suggested by the graph
could be ascertained only by means of a content analysis of both.
Without wishing to spin out still another speculative thread, one
may suggest that this industry may be one in which the chain of direct
causality runs mainly from major inventions to the level of investment
and from the latter or both to run-of-the-mill inventions. That is,
important inventions in this industry may conceivably dominate the
level of investment, and inventing generally may respond to invest-
ment in this industry in the ways suggested earlier for the railroad
industry. The hypothesis that important inventions dominate invest-
ment would become tenable if it could be shown that the paper
industry—perhaps because its products on the average occupied a
smaller share of their respective markets than was the case with the
products of the other three industries—faced a product demand that
was more responsive to cuts in price and to new and improved products
than the demand confronting the other three industries was. In that
event, innovations would tend to stimulate aggregate investment in the
industry. When such conditions do not exist, the level of investment in
an industry is likely to be dominated by the external factors that govern
demand.
In brief, the trend movements of patents and investment run roughly
parallel in railroading, petroleum refining, and papermaking. In
farming, however, these variables rise together until the mid-l910's but
then patents decline while investment in implements and machinery
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pursues a choppy but slightly rising course. The long swings in patents
and investment seem approximately synchronized in both railroading
and farming. In petroleum refining and papermaking, however, long
swings in investment, if they exist, are not observable in our data. Nor
is the existence of long swings in patenting in petroleum refining at all
certain.
Important inventions lead at the outset in all four industries, but
their subsequent relation to the other two variables seems unclear. In
petroleum's second growth cycle, they lead patents and may lead in-
vestment at the start but in the same growth cycle they later decline
absolutely after both investment and patents. In railroading, the later
long swings in important inventions are approximately concurrent
with those in patents and investment. In farming, where the number of
important inventions in our chronology is relatively small, no obvious
relation between these inventions and the other two variables appears.
In papermaking, however, the graph suggests the possible existence of
three or four long swings in important inventions which lead somewhat
similar movements in patents.
The variety of the relations thus far observed indicates the desira-
bility of decomposing some of our variables in an effort to determine
whether the differences actually exist or merely result from incompara-
bilities in the underlying data, e.g. the inclusion of product and process
patents in papermaking, and process patents in petroleum refining.
For the present, at least, the evidence and the reasoning developed
earlier suggest that inventive activity tends to rise and fall with the
sales of the product which the inventions improve, although other
factors undoubtedly also play a role. In industries like railroading
where investment lags behind sales, one would therefore anticipate a
tendency for product inventions to lead equipment inventions. While
the bearing of this line of reasoning on process inventions is not clear,
where process inventions entail equipment changes, one may conjec-
ture that their timing will tend to be the same as that of equipment
sales.
Note on the Role of Science in the Four Industries
In light of the common belief that modern inventions represent the
industrial application of prior scientific discoveries, a belief reflected
in some of the other conference papers and partially justified by
examples too well known to warrant repeating, the four researchers
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who compiled the chronologies of important inventions were in-
structed to note any suggestion in the literature that a particular
scientific discovery or any other factor prompted a particular invention
included in their chronologies.
For most of the roughly 1,000 inventions in our four chronologies,
the records unfortunately omit mention of stimulating factors, but the
subject is mentioned in a number of cases, almost always referring to
industrial problems the inventors sbught to solve. In only one or two
cases in petroleum refining and papermaking did prior scientific dis-
coveries appear to constitute a direct stimulus. At present, therefore,
the direct influence of individual scientific discoveries, even in in-
dustries like petroleum refining and paper with their strong dependence
on chemistry, seems to have been nominal. Possibly careful research
into unpublished materials would raise this estimate.
This, however, should not be interpreted as meaning that scientific
discoveries may not have played a crucial role in many of the major
and perhaps minor inventions in these four industries. It merely means
that in our industries science has been like a book on a reference shelf—
taken down when needed and enriching and perhaps even making
possible what is accomplished. The point is only that scientific dis-
coveries per se have apparently seldom constituted a direct stimulus
to the making of important (and presumably unimportant) inventions
in these four industries.
Finally, it may be suggested that more powerful than individual
scientific discoveries as a general precondition for invention in these
industries has been the pervasiveness of an empirical, experimental
attitude, an attitude characteristic of modern society and reflecting a
popular belief in the efficacy of experimental science. But, of course,
this general and indispensable precondition can hardly explain the
temporal variations in invention in these or other industries.
Concluding Remarks
Why should economists be interested in patent statistics since un-
published attempts by Sanders, Griliches, and the present author to
compare these data for individual industries with data on output per
unit of input in the same industries reveal no consistent relationships?
This is a fair question and one which was raised at the Conference in
connection with the first draft of this paper.
Two answers, at different levels, can be given to the question. The
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most important in the present context is the light which a study of the
data has already cast on fundamental questions of social theory and
the theory of economic development. Many, if not most, economists,
historians, sociologists, and anthropologists find in scientific discovery
and invention a pair of exogenous variables which together or separate-
ly largely explain long-term social change and economic growth. A
whole theoretical superstructure has been built around this postulate
by one school of sociologists. In economics, anthropology, and history,
system building is uncommon, but it would be easy to cite authors in
these fields who make the same facile technologically deterministic
assumption. Much more important, the same assumption seems to
serve as a tacit article of faith and point of departure for both laymen
and many social scientists.
In public and in the universities, we are constantly told that science
shapes our lives, and that the rest of culture lags behind changing
technology. In economics, waves of investment are often, if not
usually, in certain contexts construed as waves of innovation and
imitation a la Schumpeter. The half-truth of these statements is hardly
ever made whole by correlated statements showing how our lives
shape science, how technology lags behind the rest of culture, and how
economic change induces waves of innovation. The atomic bomb and
advances in nuclear science are imputed to non-Euclidean geometry,
Einstein (emc2), and a few foreign born physicists. The obvious
role of World War II and its aftermath, of a system of dangerously
entangled rival nation-states, and of the expenditure of several billion
dollars a year on research is hardly mentioned. High farm surpluses
are accounted a consequence of the lag of culture behind technological
change, because the farm population has failed to adjust to higher
productivity. Yet, the lag is just as much in the opposite direction.
Farm technology, after all, has failed to develop new uses for farm
products which would eliminate the surpluses.
Finally, let me citejust one example of a wave of innovation induced
by economic change. While Schumpeter is correct in assigning a large
role to the automobile industry in the so-called Kondratieff which
began around the turn of the century, it seems almost obvious, to this
writer at least, that the automobile came when it did more because of
economic and social changes than because of technological change as
such. In the first place, in the automobile, prestige, flexibility, privacy,
recreation, and utility are combined in ways which only an individual-
istic high-per-capita-income society could afford or develop. (The
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so-called bicycle craze of the 1890's was part of the same phenomenon.)
The automobile, after all, did not and has not revolutionized life in low-
income India or China. Its effects have been confined primarily to the
United States and other industrialized countries, roughly in pro-
portion to income. A good case can be made for the contention that
among the indispensable conditions for the coming of the automobile
age were relatively high levels of income, at least for the middle-income
classes, and an individualistic society.24
Secondly, there is no warrant for supposing that the advent of the
automobile depended on the development of the internal combustion
engine. At the turn of the century, after the industry was thoroughly
launched, experts were still divided over whether the automobile of
the future would be driven by steam, electricity, or gasoline. Each
type was heavily represented in the market. Even more important, the
first "locomotives" over a century and a half ago were not locomotives
at all but automobiles—engine-driven road vehicles. Had the wealthy
of that day wanted mechanical playtoys as did those of a century later,
the automobile industry could have come nearly a hundred years
before it did. Even so, steam-powered buses operated for a few years
in the first half of the nineteenth century on some of the highways of
England, until driven from them by vested interests. Putting the
vehicle on rails, hitching cars behind it, and converting the whole into
a means of public transportation was as much a reflection of the
political and socio-economic elements of the situation as of the
technological characteristics of the machine. (One implication of this
analysis is that our earlier imputation of the decline in railroad invest-
ment and invention after about 1910 to the invention of the automobile
was a conventional over-simplification.)
The antidote urged here for the popular conception of the role of
science and technology is far from new. Bagehot said long ago, "Most
men of genius are susceptible and versatile, and fall into the style of
their age." The same view has been cogently argued by and
by others. It has been overdone by those Marxists who seek to sub-
stltute economic determinism for the currently more popular scientific
and technological determinism. The antidote merely recognizes the
wholesale interdependence of changes in society and changes in the
state of knowledge. It regards the two somewhat like blades of a
24Khrushchev'sstatement on looking at our west coast's jammed freeways comes to
mind.
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scissors. One is not an inert material on which the other operates
ad libitum.
The lack of currency of this alternative and more appropriate con-
struction of events is explained primarily by the absence of substantial
objective evidence of a two-way flow between the variables. Such
evidence has already begun to come from the study of patent statistics,
as this paper indicates. If the study of the data accomplishes no more
than a righting of the balance and an elimination of the present serious
distortion in social theory; if it does no more than persuade social
scientists and through them the public that men shape science and
technology as much as these forces shape men, that the production of
knowledge, though doubtless in lesser measure than the production of
goods, responds to social pressures including those of the market, as
well as to the exigencies of genius; then the study of patent statistics will
have contributed its fair share to the advancement of social science.
These considerations pave the way for the second answer to the
question with which this section began. After socioeconomic forces
have directed the activities of inventors, similar though even greater
forces affect the fate of their brain children. Between the discovery of
new knowledge and its filtration through industry lie the processes of
innovation and diffusion. These processes in turn are drastically
altered by depression and prosperity, war and peace, the advent of rival
and inventions, and the secular rise and fall of the
industries concerned. Hence, there is little reason to suppose that the
economic impact of the average invention in an industry will be the
same over time. The invention of a new product or process is but the
first link in a long, poorly-understood chain of events.
The study of patent statistics is consequently but one stage in the
study of that chain. 26
26 Afurther point in answer to the question which opened this section of the paper
may be mentioned here. It is not logical to assume that the average invention of a given
period should yield the same increase in output per unit of input as does the average in-
vention of some other period. If we suppose as a first approximation that the cost of
making the average invention is constant over time, then as an industry (or firm) grows,
it will pay it to seek inventions which yield increasingly smaller increases in output per
unit of input. Similiarly, as an industry declines, inventions which yield increasingly large
increases in output per unit of input will be sought. In brief, it is the saving in total cost,
or the increase in total output, that is likely to provide the incentive for invention, and
not the increase in output per unit of input.
It was this line of reasoning, following his failure to find any clear relation between
patenting and later changes in output per unit of input, which led the author to seek and
find a positive association between the volume of patent applications and the volume of
employment of all resources in the United States from 1869 to 1938 (Cf., Schmookler,
"The Level of Inventive Activity"). Whether the association observed is to be explained
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APPENDIX
Note on Statistics of Patents Granted by Industry
Anyone wishing to use statistics of patents classified by industry must
recognize that he will be able to find out little concerning temporal
changes in (1) the propensity to patent in each industry, (2) the
quality of the average patented invention, or (3) the quantity of
inventive inputs actually employed per patented invention. About all
that can be said with confidence at present is that, roughly since 1940,
there has apparently been a decline in the ratio of patents granted to
corporations to inventions made by corporations. The economic input
per patented corporate invention may also have increased since 1940.
The reasons for suspecting that these changes have occurred are
mentioned in the author's comment on Sanders' paper in this volume
and will be discussed by himin a forthcoming critique and review of the
literature on patent statistics. Simon Kuznets and Barkev Sanders
discuss some of the possible difficulties in interpreting patent statistics
in their papers in this volume,
Yet, despite these largely insoluble difficulties, it seems very reason-
able to believe that far more railroad inventions were made around
1910 than in the decades before or after, that far more petroleum
refining inventions were made in the 1920's than in earlier years, and
that the number of papermaking inventions grew fairly continuously
until the depressed 1930's. Given common knowledge about the
economic growth patterns of the industries concerned, acceptance of
the data as indicative of the trends and long swings in inventive output
places no strain on one's credulity. (On the other hand, the author's
very limited knowledge about the growth of agriculture provides him
with no similar assurance in the case of farm patents.) By the same
token, declines in patenting in wars and deep depressions and increases
in patenting with the return of peace or prosperity can be readily
accepted as indicative of the behavior of the output of inventions and
the input of inventive effort (except, of course, for war-associated
industries).
by this reasoning is not clear. However, this finding, in conjunction with a recognition
that the processes of innovation and diffusion occur in a changing environment, suggests
that the lack of correspondence between inventions patented and later changes in output
per unit of input does not diminish the utility of patent statistics in the study of economic
growth.
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PREPARATION OF THE SPECIFIC SERIES USED
The conceptual and operational difficulties associated with the com-
pilation of statistics of patents issued by industry deserve more atten-
tion than can be afforded here. On the conceptual side lies the problem
of choosing the criteria for assigning a given invention to one industry
instead of to another. This choice is naturally affected by the purpose
at hand: one industry may inspire the invention, another manufacture
it,•and a third use it.
In each case the assignment might differ depending on whether the
interest is in the industry immediately, or the industry ultimately
inspiring, producing, or using the invention. Whatever the purpose,
the implementation of the criteria chosen is impeded by the host of
inventions that cut across many industries (whether the latter be
inspirers, makers, or users), and which therefore cannot be properly
assigned to a single industry.
In the present study the investigator assigned inventions to the
current main producing or using industry. If, in the case of a given
invention, both the producing and using industries were to be included
in the project, the invention was assigned to both. Silos, for example,
were assigned to both construction and agriculture. Inventions with
significant multiple industry application, such as bearings, motors,
engines, etc. were simply excluded. Any alternative treatment of this
significant group of inventions requires more knowledge than the
author has.
In practice these criteria had to be compromised. For any individual
or small group to assign to specific industries each of the nearly 3 million
patents issued by the United States Patent Office since 1836 (or, for
that matter, any sample large enough to be useful for our purpose)
would be impractical. Instead the author assigned whole Patent Office
subclasses to specific industries. The subclass is the elementary unit of
the classification system designed by the Patent Office to facilitate the
search of the prior art. Nearly 50,000 such subclasses exist, each a
member of one or another of more than 300 main classes. The average
subclass has slightly more than 50patentsin it.
Each subclass has its own definition, typically of a technological-
functional character. When the definition clearly implied that nearly
all the inventions in a given subclass would be made or used, if at all,
by a single industry the whole subclass was allocated to that industry.
When, as often, the definition provided an insufficient basis for such a
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decision but implied a reasonable possibility that at least two-thirds of
the patents might be assignable to a given industry, the investigator
sampled the patents included in the subclass in the files of the Patent
Office search room. If, on the basis of this sampling, at least two-thirds
of the patents seemed to apply to the industry, the whole subclass was
so assigned. The 10,000 subclasses ultimately assigned to 88 four-digit
industries were then reviewed by a group of principal examiners in the
Patent Office, and corrections in our industrial classification were
made in accordance with their suggestions.
The resulting statistics of patents issued classified by industry thus
necessarily include some inventions that do not belong to the industry
to which they have been credited and exclude some that do. As is
common in life, however, the signs of omission probably outweigh
those of commission. In all likelihood, at least 95percent of the
inventions covered by the series for our four industries belong to the
industries to which they have been assigned. On the other hand, an
indeterminate number of equally pertinent inventions have been
omitted because they were in highly heterogeneous subclasses. But
perhaps even more serious than the omission of inventions with
primary applicability to a given industry is the absence of inventions
with substantial multiindustry application. Whether our concern is
with the causes or with the effects of invention in an industry, such
lacunae are troublesome. Inventors traditionally seek to maximize the
generality of their inventions, and patent applicants, the generality of
their patents. A man who starts by trying to improve the woodsawing
art may end by improving the sawing art generally. Such examples
could be multiplied easily. Ideally, to study the inventions affecting or
affected by an industry one would want to know not only those
inventions pertinent to that industry alone, but also those inventions
which relate to the given industry and others as well. Unfortunately,
to determine which electric motor, for example, belongs to which
industry or group of industries was simply not feasible.
Because of the exclusion of inventions which, though primarily
applicable to a given industry, are classified in excessively mixed sub-
classes, and because of the exclusion of inventions with a substantial
multiindustry application, the resulting time series of patents by
industry provide an incomplete record of the patented inventions
arising from or affecting the industries in our project. Perhaps by
sampling all the patents issued in some years we may later be able to
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measure and correct some of the bias present because of the first
deficiency. The task of remedying the second deficiency seems hopeless.
FIELDS COVERED IN THE FOUR INDUSTRIES
The farm patents are primarily for inventions pertaining to plows,
harvesters, harrows, manure spreaders, cultivators, threshers, etc.—
bins and silos, tools, and plant husbandry. Farm tractors are omitted
because inventions relating to them are mixed in many subclasses with
technologically related nonfarm inventions. However, inventions in-
duced by the tractor in the fields covered are naturally included.
Little government agricultural research is reflected since patents
seldom result from it. The aggregate farm series presented is a sum-
mation of dozens of separate time series, each series pertaining to a
specific phase of farm technology and covering at least six Patent
Office subclasses. The patents number 83,000.
The railroad patents cover locomotives, passenger and freight cars,
draft appliances, brakes, wheels and axles, rail cleaning and snow
removing, track laying, ties, rails, switches, signals, crossing gates, and
railway mail delivery. Altogether the data reflect over 90 individual
time series and 90,000 patents. Those power plant inventions are
included which apply only to railroading and which were, in con-
sequence, classified in one of the subclasses covered. The development
of steam and diesel engines per se is not directly represented, although
some of their indirect effects undoubtedly are.
The papermaking inventions, which number 38,000, relate to the
disintegrating and grinding of wood; bleaching, preparing, and
working pulp; forming .and delivering the web; coating, finishing, and
drying paper; and special products such as boxes and envelopes, and
machines for making them. Twenty-seven individual series underlie
the aggregate for this industry.
The petroleum refining patents, 12,000 in number, pertain to bubble
towers, refining with paraffin, refining with solvents, refining with
chemicals,distillation,cracking, and petroleum products. This
aggregate is a summation of twelve separate time series.
The four industries collectively represent roughly 3,500 subclasses,
over a third of those included in the major study.
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